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Abstract 
Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (RoSCA) are informal financial institutions serving the financial service needs 
of many people in the developing countries. Though some researchers recommend the transformation of those institutions 
into formal ones to create economic efficiency, there is not much research on why members join those institutions and 
what benefits they derive from them. By taking an empirical example of Ethiopian equb and focusing on the financial 
feasibility of financial viability of becoming a member in RoSCA, this study assesses why members join RoSCAs. The 
survey conducted revealed that the financial motives outweigh all other motives in large equbs while the social motives 
are most important for members of small equbs. Most large and medium size equb members choose equbs than other 
possible alternatives because it is less expensive and involves very small transaction cost, if any. 
© 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of the 
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1. Introduction 
Cooperation among human societies can be traced back to the ancient times when people started to work together to enhance their 
efficiency in hunting, gathering, shelter construction and other activities. Historians have discovered evidence indicating cooperation 
among people in ancient civilizations like Greece, Rome and Egypt. Anthropologists have also uncovered evidence suggesting that 
Babylonians had practiced cooperative farming, while informal saving and loan associations had been practiced in ancient China (www, 
Umanitobia, 2011). Those informal associations are still widely used, especially in low income countries. Bouman (1994) classifies the 
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functions of informal institutions into three: provision of security or insurance, economic function, and socialization. Some informal 
institutions serve more than one function (Sandsör, 2010). Rotating Saving and Credit Associations (RoSCA) is an example, which is 
considered to be economic, social and cultural institutions (Sandsör, 2010; Bouman, 1995). 
RoSCAs, one of the oldest saving institutions in the world (Gugerty, 2007), are associations formed by a group of people willing to 
make a regular contribution to a fund which will be given to each member in whole or part on rotation basis (Ardener, 1964). It is an 
institution that aims at goal directed and planned savings yet fits into the pattern of the community (Geertz, 1962; Gugerty, 2007). 
In Ethiopia, a country where it is not uncommon to find cooperative activities among the people (Engdawork, 1995), informal self-
help institutions have existed for long in their own version. The Ethiopian version of RoSCA is called equb. The small equbs could be 
started within a group based on strong ties like friendship, business associates, school mates, or within the neighborhood. In large equbs, 
individuals that do not have close relationship might become members though each member needs to be known by at least some other 
members in the group, and their moral standing should be known by the community (Mauri, 1987). 
     In spite of the different justifications they give to the raison d'être of RoSCAs, researchers in economics (Besley et al., 1993, 1994; 
Dejene, 1993), development studies (Bouman, 1994,1995; Tirfe, 1999) or anthropology (Ardener, 1964) agree on the huge role and 
potential that RoSCAs have in the daily life of the society practicing them. Study cited by Bouman (1995) reveal a RoSCA membership 
rate of 50% to 95% among adult population in Nigeria, Cameroon, Gambia, Liberia, Republic of Congo, Togo and Ivory Coast. It is 
estimated that an amount equivalent to half of the national saving in Cameroon, double amount of saving in organized sector in Kerala 
(India), and 8% to 10% of the GDP in Ethiopia is mobilized by RoSCAs. In a recent study in Ethiopia, Temesgen (2008) has found that 
the annual turnover of four equbs he considered in Addis Ababa, the capital city, was equivalent to 0.15% of the net current deposit 
maintained by all commercial banks in the country by the end of August, 2007. 
     Given all those contributions and roles they play in the economy, nonetheless, RoSCAs cannot escape criticisms. Mauri (1987) argues 
that the presence of those informal financial institutions in the economy would create dualism in the financial market at the macro level 
which will in turn contribute to inefficient allocation of resources. He further stated that those informal institutions cannot accommodate 
the needs of the people as the income and saving of the people increase, and hence, need to be transformed. Dejene (1993) and Tirfe 
(1999) have also written about the possibility of transforming informal institutions into formal and revealed lack of proper policies in 
utilizing the institutions efficiently. 
     But before discussing and recommending policy improvements about the linkage, the reasons why the members join informal 
financial institutions (for this case equb) should be studied. This will help to come up with a proper recommendation about how to utilize 
those institutions. There are, however, few studies conducted in the area. Those few studies have focused on the urban equbs where 
members are believed to have better access to formal financial institution services than those who are in rural areas. Using data from a 
panel survey of households conducted between 1994 and 2004 in urban Ethiopia, Kedir et al. (2011) discusses as to why people want to 
use banks and equbs concurrently. Temesgen (2008), in his discussion about the potential of Equbs in Ethiopia has also assessed the 
motives of equb participants in four large equbs from the capital city. Both of those researches, however, have focused on urban equbs 
only. This research will fill this gap by taking samples in both urban and rural Ethiopia from small, medium and large size equbs. By 
focusing on the financial feasibility of participating in equb this paper address the following research questions: (a) why do members join 
equb while they can use other alternatives? (b) Once they join equbs, why do they want to keep on their participation? (c) Do the motives 
of participants differ based on location of equb and size? 
2. Literature review and theoretical background 
2.1. Characteristics and types of RoSCA 
The following are the major characteristics of RoSCAs: 
     Membership: The number of participants in a given cycle of RoSCA could range from handful to several hundred (Ardener, 1964). 
Members could be selected based on age, ethnic affiliation, occupation, religion or educational background, political affiliation or any 
given social tie (Ardener, 1964; Sandsör, 2010). 
     Contribution: The contribution of members, sometimes known as hands or shares, could be in the form of cash or kind or a 
combination. For this study we consider only those with cash contribution. 
     Transferability: The transferability of the funds in a given RoSCA depends on the agreement and consent of the members at the time 
of establishment or in due course. 
     The fund: Even though all members contribute fixed and equal amount throughout the life of a given RoSCA cycle, the advantages 
that they enjoy is not equal. At some point in a given cycle, all members will switch from a position of net saving to net debtor except 
those who collect the pot at the beginning and end of the cycle that will make them a net debtor and net saver in the whole life of the 
cycle respectively (Callier cited in Dejene, 1993). 
     Enforcing mechanism: Different enforcing mechanisms are being used depending on the base by which the RoSCA is established. 
Even if there is a possibility of excluding defecting members from future RoCSA cycles as a mechanism for enforcement, Anderson et al. 
(2009) argue that RoSCAs could never be sustainable unless there is an external or social sanctioning mechanism. 
     Based on the pot allocations system RoSCAs are classified into bidding, random (Sandsör, 2010; Dagnelie and Lemay-Boucher, 2008; 
Besley et al., 1994; Ambech and Treich, 2003); fixed or pre deterministic (Sandsör, 2010; Ambech and Treich, 2003); and decision 
RoSCA (Dagnelie and Lemay-Boucher, 2008). 
     The bidding RoSCA is characterized by the allocation of pots in a bid format. Bids could be made at the beginning for the whole life 
of the cycle or at the beginning of each period in the cycle (Sandsör, 2010; Dagnelie and Lemay-Boucher, 2008). The bid could take a 
premium or a discount format (Bouman, 1995). In a random RoSCA, members put a fixed amount of money into a pot periodically and 
then pots will be allocated randomly to one of the members (Besley et al., 1994). A lottery could be drawn to choose the pot winner to 
stick with the norm of fairness in the institution (Sandsör, 2010). 
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     In a fixed or pre-deterministic RoSCA, the organization as well as rotation system is the same as the random RoSCAs. The only 
difference in this case is that the pot allocation order will be the same as the first life cycle if the life of the RoSCA will be continued with 
the start of another cycle (Sandsör, 2010; Ambech and Treich, 2003). In a decision RoSCA the pot will be allocated based on the decision 
imposed by the administrative body (Dagnelie and Lemay-Boucher, 2008). This categorization, however, might not be comprehensive. 
As Geertz (1962) notes, the structure and operation of RoSCAs is changing from time to time with different tendencies in different place. 
2.2. Saving strategies reviewed 
     If an individual spends all the money s/he has in a given period and still wants to purchase or consume something, s/he has three 
options: to go without it until the next income, to sell some asset and purchase what is needed, or to find some way to tap into past or 
future income. Naturally, the third choice is preferable and it is possible using financial services (Rutherford, n.d). 
     Financial services help individuals to manage their savings in two ways. The first is by providing access to the past incomes stored in 
different saving forms. Second, financial institutions offer lending services against a saving an individual plan to make in the future. A 
saving strategy, thus, could take three forms (ibid): 
¾ Saving up strategy: a strategy where an individual puts a sequence of savings and accumulates money into a large sum 
enough for serving some needed expenditure. 
¾ Saving down strategy: this strategy is related to borrowing and repaying loan. The basic difference in saving up and saving 
down strategy is that the availability of the lump sum money before the savings in the latter while it will be ready after in the former.  
¾ Saving through: this strategy is a mix of the saving down and saving up strategies. The lump sum money becomes accessible 
at some point in a series of savings. A good example here is an insurance coverage. 
2.3. New institutional economics and transaction cost economics 
     The formation of institutions is underlined by the cost of transaction which in turn is determined by the level of information 
completeness and the limited capacity of human beings to process the information. “The costs of transacting arise because information is 
costly and asymmetrically held by the parties to exchange. The costs of measuring the multiple valuable dimensions of the goods or 
services exchanged or of the performance of agents, and the costs of enforcing agreements determine transaction costs” (North, 1995:2). 
Therefore, human beings build institutions to reduce uncertainty in the exchange process. Institutions are composed of formal rules, 
informal norms and the enforcement characteristics of both. It is the mix of these three that determines the economic performance (North, 
1995). 
     Ardener (1964) compares the advantage of joining RoSCAs with becoming a customer of banks or private money lenders. Because of 
the information asymmetry (Hansmann, 1999), RoSCAs are able to provide small scale credits that banks are not interested in. For the 
banks, it is not easy to assess the reliability of new customers. The RoSCA organizers are in a more favorable condition to do that which 
will make the transaction cost much less. In the case of money lenders, the interest rate is very high, sometimes more than 100%. In 
RoSCAs, however, it is very low in case it exists. The justification behind could be the low risk of default since the social enforcement 
mechanisms are very strong making participants hesitant for a long period before they raise their reputation in the community. This keeps 
the transaction cost very low. 
2.4. Possible reasons about why members join RoSCAs?  
     Previous researches conducted in the field revealed different justifications as to why members join RoSCAs. The first rationale 
stressed that RoSCAs are a means to purchase durable goods. RoSCAs as an institution will help to create Pareto improvement in a 
society where the capital market is fragmented (Dejene, 1993). The reduction in waiting time to buy a bulky asset is one of the areas 
where the Pareto improvement is reflected. Anderson et al. (2009) coin the term “early pot motive” as the motive of joining RoSCAs for 
the purchase of durable goods. Gugerty (2007) challenged this proposition by noting that if the main motive of joining RoSCAs is saving 
for the purchase of indivisible goods, the person who wins the last pot will not be better off by joining RoSCA. Thus, he will leave the 
group. Then, second to last person will become the last and he will decide the same thing since he will not be better off by taking the last 
pot. In such a way, no one will stay at the RoSCA at the end of the day. 
     The insurance motive is the other contending suggestion given to why members join RoSCAs. It stresses that RoSCA members do not 
necessarily want to take the pot early since they consider RoSCAs as insurance scheme. RoSCAs could be taken as insurance by 
members that do not receive the pot yet and suddenly need some money because of emergency. But this only works under a condition 
where other members and the next pot winner are willing to switch the order (Sandsör, 2010). A critics against the insurance mechanism 
is that people grouping together in a given RoSCA generally belong to the same village, or have similar occupations or revenues. This is 
not really compatible with risk-sharing activities against idiosyncratic shocks (Ambech and Treich, 2003). 
     Ambec and Treich (2003), on the other hand come up with the “social pressure model”. In the model they assume that individuals are 
not able to resist the day to day pressure from the society and hence they use RoSCAs as device to escape from pressures. Interestingly, 
they challenge the “early pot motive” model in a way that participants may end up with the purchase of durable goods with the pot but 
they did it to avoid the question of income divisibility among relatives. 
     Another reason why people might want to join RoSCA and tie themselves with some kind of saving pattern is their knowledge about 
their procrastinating nature – the feeling of “I can start saving tomorrow, not today” (Sandsör, 2010). Thus, they need some kind of 
commitment device to cope up the procrastination difficulties. Here is the point of departure for Gugerty (2007) to develop the 
commitment device model. For Gugerty (2007), RoSCAs is a commitment mechanism for those individuals that do not have access to 
good commitment technologies. Commitment mechanisms do have two important features: the deposit side features and the withdrawal 
side features (Ashraf et al., 2003). The deposit side features help individuals to make a regular periodic deposit while the features on the 
withdrawal side discourage or deter withdrawals. 
     Finally, Anderson et al. (2003; 2009), in what they call “household conflict motive” come up with a justification that some individuals 
want to join RoSCAs because of an intra-household conflict. According to them, the household maximizes its joint utility under some 
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budget constraint and a conflict could occur in a household as far as the budget allocation is concerned. Unlike men, who only care about 
consumption in a household, women are believed to be careful about both having durable goods and consumption in a household. Thus, 
women usually use RoSCAs as a mechanism to solve this household conflict. Sometimes, they even join RoSCAs without their 
husbands’ knowledge. Dagnelie and Lemay-Boucher (2008), however, challenged the “household conflict motive” in their study in 
Benin. 40% of the sample groups in their study require spouse approval to become a member of the group. 
3. Method 
     This study employs survey to collect data related to the reason why members join equbs. Randomly distributed to ordinary members, 
the questionnaire has four parts. The first part includes questions related to demographic information of the respondent. Questions related 
to member’s preference of equb type, pot assignment as well as equb structure are embraced in the second part. The third section entails 
questions regarding member’s attitude towards formal financial sector. Finally, affirmative questions asserting consistency of 
respondent’s answer as well as questions used to summarize the whole questionnaire are asked. The questions asked in the questionnaire 
generally cover the following areas: (a) the reason/s why members join equbs; (b) the reason/s why members prefer equbs to other 
options available; (c) what substitutes equb if they have to stop taking part in one. 
     As one of the objectives of this study is to investigate if there is a difference in motive of members of equb based on the location of the 
equbs (urban – rural dichotomy) the samples are taken from both urban and rural areas in Ethiopia. Equbs in Addis Ababa, the capital 
city, have been selected to get urban samples. Addis Ababa is selected because the city hosts different large markets like Mercato 
(supposedly the largest open market in East Africa), Shiromeda and Shola which will help to get the largest equbs. The city also 
represents different group of people based on wealth, ethnicity, or social status which will help to get the real urban setting that could 
represent other urban areas of the country. The rural samples are taken in Amhara Regional State, North Wollo Administrative Zone, 
Meket Woreda (district) where one of the authors comes from and has a better knowledge about. He has also the language skill that 
helped him to communicate easily with the participants in the research. The researcher has also benefited from the social network he has 
in the area which facilitates access to find right persons that could provide the relevant information.  
     Furthermore, three categories of equb are identified in both rural and urban areas based on their size as large, medium and small. The 
large equbs are usually dominated by traders. The pot is collected weekly and the minimum contribution per person to the pot is 1,000 
Ethiopian Birr (ETB). In medium size equbs, a full monthly contribution per person to the pot is between 500 to 1000 ETB.  The pot is 
usually collected and distributed to the winner every month. Most medium equbs are organized by civil servants or individuals with 
regular monthly income. In the small equbs, the contribution per member is less than 500 ETB. The pot could either be allocated on 
monthly or weekly basis. Those small equbs are usually organized by those individuals who do not have a regular income. The members 
of the small equbs in this research consist of farmers, weavers, house wives, local brewers (known as tela) and small-scale retailers. 
     A total of 121 questionnaires have been distributed. 91 (75.21%) have been returned filled while 1 (0.8%) questionnaire has been 
discarded since it was not filled properly. 45(49.45%) of the returned questionnaires were filled by respondents from urban equbs 
whereas rural samples filled and return the rest 46 (50.55%) questionnaires. See Appendix A (table 1) for the detail about sample equbs 
studied and the number of samples taken. In addition to the data collected via questionnaire from members, an interview has been 
conducted with organizers of the considered equbs. The researcher has also conducted an interview with the CEO of a microfinance 
institution (MFI) known as Meket Microfinance Institution operating in the district since 1998. 
4. Results and findings 
Depending on the number of members and their choice on the frequency of contribution, the duration of a given cycle is decided. As the 
cycle duration gets longer, the chance for the money to be affected by inflation or time value of money will increase. The survey result 
revealed that most of the medium size equb members (30 or 94%) prefer the number of participants in a single cycle to be less than 20. 
Similarly, 85% of those in the urban-small equbs prefer the number of members to be below 20 while all respondents in the rural-small 
equbs prefer less than 30 participants in a given cycle. On the other hand, 27(85%) of the large equb members prefers to have more than 
30 members in one cycle (see Table 1, Appendix B). The reason for the large equb members is their need to win a large sum of money in 
one cycle. Large money collected from equb is usually used to expand or finance working capital of an established business, or even to 
establish a new business which will otherwise be impossible and when it is possible a bit costly. For the small and medium equb 
members, to the contrary, large number of participant means administrative problem as well as long cycle time. In addition, their need is 
only to save and commit themselves probably to purchase some durable good or spend it on some holiday. 
     The next question asked to respondents in relation to their equb participation was about their time preference to take the pot. 
Consequently 72% of the respondents from large equbs want to take the pot at the beginning of the cycle. The justification is that they 
want to work with the collected money (the pot) with small interest or buying expense, if any. According to them they can repay the equb 
contribution using the profit they earn by investing the pot money. It was found that only 3% of large equb participants want to take the 
pot at the end of the cycle. To the contrary, 85% of the respondents from small size urban equbs want to take the pot at the end of the 
cycle, because they want to save the money. For the medium size equbs (both in urban and rural areas), the response is fairly distributed 
between the periods of the cycle (see table 2, Appendix B). 
     Equbs could be assigned based on lottery, periodic preference of members to take, or on auction basis. Equb members have been 
asked about their pot assignment method preference. From the total 91 respondents, 49 (54%) want to have the lottery kind of assignment 
in their equb. The majority of the large equb members (78.6%) want the lottery kind of arrangement. This is because of the overlapping 
demand for the pot among members and hence the easiest as well as fair way of assignment is lottery. In small equbs (both in urban and 
rural), 16 (60%) respondents want the pot assignment to be based on the need of the members i.e the pot should be given to a member 
who want the money urgently during the pot assignment time. The bid kind of pot assignment is also practiced in large equbs which 
shows the need of members to take early even by paying a charge for the money (see table 3, Appendix B). 
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Once the pot money is assigned, two members can change the order among themselves voluntarily. In this regard, a difference based on 
equb size has been noticed in the survey. 19 (59.3%) of the 32 large size equb members are either unwilling to change or require a sales 
commission or charge should they change the pot order they win to another member in need. In small and medium size equbs, however, 
the reverse is true. This is one of the indicators for the dominance of the financial motive in large equbs than medium and small size. 
     An individual who is financially motivated while joining RoSCA is expected to calculate the financial benefit that he is going to enjoy 
by becoming a member. As expected most of the large equb members (60%) think about the time value of their money in equb and that is 
why they always want to take the money early. In total, 51 (56%) of the respondents have never thought about the time value of money 
they contribute to equb while the rest 40 (44%) think about it (see figure 1, Appendix B). Interestingly, among the 44% respondents who 
had thought about time value of money in equb, 22 (55%) do not want the introduction of interest calculation in their equb. Even in the 
urban-large equbs where large amount of money is mobilized, it is only 3 (21%) of the respondents who want interest to be calculated for 
the money circulated in their equb.  
     Another indicator about the motives of members to join RoSCA could be the possible substitute institution that they consider to get the 
service that they are enjoying from RoSCA. If we consider the large equbs, 25 (78%) of the 32 respondents stated that they would 
consider banks and MFIs as a substitute for equb (see/insert table 4, Appendix B). The medium size equb samples also shares the idea of 
the large equb samples – 22(69%) choose banks and MFIs as a substitute. When it comes to the small equbs, nevertheless, it is only 
7(26%) who think like their medium and large size equb counter parts. 18 (67%) of the members in small size equbs said that no 
institution could substitute equbs. 
     The next question was about why they keep on participating in equb while they can use formal institutions. For 93% of large urban 
equb members, using formal institutions is expensive, or the procedure is long or uncomfortable for them, or there is no freedom to spend 
the money on the business they want to work on, or a bank loan will make one worry. One of the organizers stated that “…let alone the 
expensive interest rate charged by banks and microfinance institutions, the procedure is lengthy. As business men we don’t want that. In 
addition, banks require physical collateral…If you don’t win the lottery in equb and you need the money urgently, you can buy from other 
members without any procedure and time wastage. If you cannot get it in either way, then you will finally get your money at the end 
which is similar to saving it at the bank…”  
     For 59% of the small equb members, the reason that keeps them participating in equbs having the chance to be a customer of a formal 
institution is their good experience with equbs. 15% said that it was expensive to use formal institutions. The rest 26% said that it was not 
easy and the requirements are very hard to meet to get a loan from a formal institution while it was timely and easy to access fund from 
equb. The chairman of one of the smallest equbs commented that “…In the MFI every activity is strictly planned and there is a deadline 
for the repayment and if you fail to do so, they will not compromise or wait you until you get money. They will take it to the court. Thus, I 
use my equb money as a backup for the repayment in case I fail to stick with the repayment deadline for MFI loan using my other income. 
I can even get a loan from an individual using my equb pot as a guarantee or collateral. Thus, I will never stop participating equb in 
spite of my involvement in deposit or credit transactions with MFIs.” When it come to the medium size respondents, 6 (19%) of them 
stated that it’s expensive to use formal institutions and 5 (16%) relishes the freedom of spending the equb money to whatever they want 
which they could not enjoy if they take a loan from formal institutions. The chairperson of a medium size equb explained in an interview 
that “…I receive my salary in cash and whenever I need to go to the formal institutions I think of the long process for a transaction. I 
should also use my office time since the working hours are similar with my work place. But I cannot use my office time because I may 
clash with my boss. Thus, I and my colleagues here prefer to establish equb. In addition it is also expensive to borrow from microfinance 
institutions and it is totally unthinkable to borrow small amount of money from banks. The equb will also make us committed to save.”  
     In order to see the view from the other side, the researcher conducted an interview with the CEO of a MFI operating in the area for the 
last ten years. According to him, his customers are sensitive to the service processing even more than they are sensitive to the interest 
rates. “…when I discuss with the customers, they usually tell me that they prefer our institution because the processing time and the 
procedures are shorter in our company than our competitor” said the CEO, Mr Fantaye Moges. He also mentioned that his company 
approached some equbs so that the members could become customers. However, most of them do not like the process in the formal 
institutions. 
     When they were asked about transforming their informal association to a formal one like a cooperative or credit associations, 
surprisingly, no respondent from the urban equbs mentioned that they had a discussion in their equb to transform their institution into a 
formal one. One of the interviewed organizers stated that: “….transforming to formal institution? Is it not easy to be a customer of an 
established bank than transforming our equb to a new formal institution like cooperative? Have you consider the establishment cost? 
What about the administrative cost? The money will be stacked somewhere for nothing if it is going to be formal. The operation is not 
going to be faster like equb…”   
     In the rural equbs, however, members have made discussions with their colleagues on the possibility of transforming their equb into a 
formal one. But, interestingly, transforming for them doesn’t mean totally replacing/changing the equb into some other institution. 
Rather, it means, creating/forming another independent organization that can supplement/complement the equb by members, while 
maintaining the operation of the equb. 
5. Financial analysis based on empirical example 
5.1. No involvement in equb, save it in a bank periodically 
     This option is a risk free option as long as the individual keep on depositing the periodic payments. In this case, the total money that 
an individual will have at the end of the nth period can be calculated using the future value of annuity formula: 
    FVoa = PMT [((1 + i)n - 1) / i]                                                                                   (1) 
Where, FVoa is the future value of annuity PMT is value of the periodic payment i is the periodic interest rate (annual interest / number 
of periods) n is the number of periods for annuity contribution. 
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     For our case we assume that the individual will save 2,000 ETB every week for 52 weeks or a year for all scenarios demonstrated 
below. Given a 5% annual interest rate (the prevailing bank saving interest rate in Ethiopia), the weekly interest rate will be calculated as 
5%/52. Thus the FV of money accumulated at the end of the 52nd week will be: = 2000 [((1 + (5%/52))52 - 1)/ (5%/52)]   
                                        = 106,591.35 ETB  
     Of this value 104,000 (calculated as 52 * 2000) is the principal, making the interest income 2,591.35 ETB. The formula can be 
modified to find only the interest income as follows:          
         Interest income from annuity = {PMT [((1 + i)n - 1) / i]} – (PMT*n)                   (2) 
5.2. Involvement in equb 
     The same individual can also join equb having the same amount of money to contribute. The person joins equb as if s/he will get the 
last pot since that is the point where s/he can be 100% sure about getting the pot (assuming there is no default by members). Thus, 
logically s/he can keep on contributing the 2,000 ETB periodic contributions irrespective of when s/he will actually get the pot. However, 
he may get the pot at the first period but he will contribute the periodic payment without touching the pot money he won. The outcome is, 
however, depend on what the individual is going to with the money. We consider two options for our case:  
i.  Deposit it in a bank immediately after getting the pot money at the bank interest rate – in  our case 5% 
ii.  Or invest it somewhere for which a return above the average bank saving interest rate can be obtained. 
i. Deposit it in a bank immediately after getting the pot: 
    Here the individual uses both equb and bank. S/He will bring the pot money to deposit in a bank. The interest rate is the bank deposit 
interest rate. Once the individual deposited the money it is assumed that he will not withdraw it until the end of the equb cycle. This 
individual joins equb instead of saving by his own in a bank. If we should calculate the financial benefit that the individual enjoys by 
joining equb, we should know the period that he will get the pot money. The financial benefit (interest income) he enjoyed differs based 
on the period he gets the pot since the interest is dependent on the time that the money will stay in the bank. At the beginning of the cycle, 
however, the individual do not know when he will get it. Therefore, we should calculate the interest income for every possible period. At 
5% interest rate compounded weekly, the individual’s interest income at the end of the 52nd period given the period where he get the pot 
money can be calculated using the simple future value formula: 
                                FV= PV * (1+i)n                                                                                   (3) 
 
The individual’s interest gain will be high if s/he wins and deposits the pot money in a bank in early period. If s/he wins the 1st pot and 
deposits it immediately, the interest income will be 5,224.54 ETB while s/he will not have an interest if s/he wins the last pot. Now we 
can compute when the individual will be better off financially if he joins equb instead of using the bank. What we should note here is that 
the gain from the bank if the individual don’t involve in equb is constant since the deposit is not affected by other parties involved unlike 
the case in equb. The breakeven point between the normal periodic saving and saving the equb money after getting the pot money is at 
the middle period of the equb cycle. Therefore, financially, a chance of getting the pot money at any period after the mid-point of the 
cycle will not make the individual financially better off as compared to saving in a bank assuming the transaction cost is the same in both 
cases. 
 
ii. Invest the pot money somewhere else 
     In this scenario, the outcome will depend on the expected investment return rate. If the investment rate is equal to the risk free rate, 
then the outcome will be the same as depositing the pot money in a bank immediately after getting the pot. In basic finance, however, an 
individual will not invest his money and take risk had he not been expecting a higher interest rate than the risk-free rate (bank saving 
interest rate). Thus, in our case where the bank saving interest rate is 5%, the investor should always expect a rate of return higher than 
5%. As the investment return rate increases, the breakeven period will approach to the end of the cycle. This implies that, if an individual 
expects to invest the pot money at a business where the return rate is higher than the risk free rate, he will be better off by joining equb 
even if he wins the pot at the later stages of the equb cycle. As the interest rate increases, the equilibrium point will go far to the right and 
vice versa, citrus paribus. 
     First, find the net financial gain (interest income) from risk free investment (making an ordinary annuity saving) using the ordinary 
annuity formula – this is used as a standard to compare the financial gains from equb participation using formula (1). 
     Second, in order to get the net financial gain from investing the pot money it is possible to use the future value of money formula with 
little modification. The future value of a fixed amount of money can be calculated using formula (3) where, PV is the present value of 
the fixed amount to be invested (deposited).  
     If an individual wants to calculate the period when s/he will be indifferent from saving his/her money in an ordinary annuity way or 
joining equb to save/invest the pot money somewhere it can be done using the following steps: 
     Step 1: calculate the interest to be gained by making an ordinary annuity saving in a bank – calculated using formula (2).   
     Step 2: substitute the net gain value found in step 1 to the modified version of formula 3 to find the value of X -1 using the formula: 
               Net gain = {PV [1 + i]x-1} – PV                                                                            (4) 
                              Where, x-1 - is the period where the benefit of joining equb will equal to net gain 
But one needs to take care while interpreting the value of x-1. The value indicates the remaining number of periods where the individual 
will be worse off if he wins the pot and either deposit or invest it. For example, if the value of x-1 is 7, then this means the individual will 
be better off if and only if s/he can win the pot on and before the 7th period from the last period of the equb cycle. Assuming the total 
number of 52 participants in equb and the value of x-1 is 13, this means that the individual will be better off if s/he can win on or before 
the 39th period of the equb cycle. Thus for all equbs where there are N participants, the individual will be financially better off by joining 
equb if s/he can win before the N - (x-1) period. As the interest rate or the value of i increase, the higher the value of x-1, citrus paribus. 
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Hence, if the individual is going to invest the pot money in an investment with a higher return rate, the better s/he will be by joining equb 
than making ordinary annuity saving even with a possibility of getting the pot money at the later stage of the equb cycle.  
     In the examples above we consider a situation by assuming a risk free or bank saving interest rate as a standard to compare with 
joining equb (saving up strategy). But an individual could also use the institution as a credit mechanism. 
¾ Scenario one: individuals use equb as a credit mechanism and they consider interest rate as a factor to choose from equb and 
formal institution 
     Let us assume that an individual applies and gets a credit facility of 312,000 ETB due in 2 years. According to Access Capital (www, 
access capital, 2011), the average lending interest rate in Ethiopia as of April 2011 stood at 10.3%. Assuming a quarterly repayment 
schedule, the total interest can be calculated using the formula: 
                                                                                (5) 
                         Where: - C is the periodic payment amount 
                                        P0 is the principal,  
                                        r is the annual interest rate, 
                                       N is the number of payments 
     By applying the formula, the total interest that the individual is going to pay in two years will be 37,224.56 ETB with a quarterly 
repayment of 43,653.08 ETB. If the repayment is going to be on monthly basis, the total interest to be paid will be 34,466.62 ETB. Then, 
let us assume the same individual joins an equb with a weekly contribution of 3,000 ETB where the number of participants is 104. This 
will make the pot money value equal to the loan s/he request i.e. 312,000 ETB. When s/he won the pot money, obviously will avoid the 
interest that should be paid had the money been a bank loan. This will be a pure financial benefit that the individual will earn. If the 
individual cannot win the pot as early as s/he can secure the bank loan, then s/he will be indifferent with a bank loan if s/he buys the pot 
from the equb or another individual up to the cost of 37,224.56 ETB. At this point s/he will be indifferent and will start to look at other 
factors like the timing of the money, the processing cost and the like if the buying cost of the pot is going to be higher than 37,224.56.  
     The same scenario could be taken to the medium and small size equbs. Unlike the large equbs where we consider bank as an option, 
we will consider the case of MFI for small and medium size equbs. This is because banks usually are not expected to offer credit of small 
size. The borrowing interest rate in MFIs is even much higher than the bank interest rate. According to the data found from Meket 
Microfinance Institution, the annual interest rate in MFIs range from 15% to 20% putting the average interest rate at 17.5%. If we assume 
the individual will take a loan of 12,000 ETB from an MFI with a monthly repayment scheme to be paid in a year with an interest rate of 
17.5%, the total interest that s/he will pay will be 1,167.72 ETB. If the same individual is going to join equb with 12 members where the 
contribution is on monthly basis, he can get a lump sum amount of 12,000 ETB. By doing so, he avoids an interest expense of 1,167 
ETB. Of course this could be true if the individual is able to get the pot money as early as he can get the loan from the MFI. 
9 Scenario two: individuals use equb as a credit mechanism and consider both interest rate and transaction cost as a factor to 
choose from equb and formal institution 
     In the first scenario we consider interest rate as a critical factor for choice made by an individual from formal financial institution and 
equb. But interest rate may not be the only factor for some individuals. They might be much concerned about the timeliness instead. Thus 
the individual will consider the time that the finance will be ready for use, the processing fee, the bureaucracy to be followed to secure the 
finance and other variables that will make the transaction cost higher. The transaction cost cannot be generalized for every individual. It 
is dependent on the situation where the individual is at including his/her income, the amount s/he demands, the distance to formal 
financial institutions, etc. The transaction costs will be added on the interest expense of borrowing and will give the final figure indicating 
the total cost of borrowing from bank or the total gain of getting pot money from equb. 
6. Conclusions 
Members participating in large equbs are motivated to join because of their interest to avoid higher costs caused by higher 
transaction costs in formal institutions. Thus, they prefer to use equb as a mechanism to reduce the cost of financing. As compared to 
formal institutions, the average waiting period, the transaction cost as well as the interest expense is very low in equbs. When it comes to 
middle size equbs, it is possible to say that most of the members are indeed motivated to join because they want to purchase some durable 
good. Those individuals, however, cannot implement the saving down strategy using formal institutions because of higher interest rate 
and transaction costs. On the other hand, lack of committing future and high transaction cost hinder them from using saving up strategy in 
bank or MFI. It is very difficult for low income earners to have the discipline to implement saving up strategy at home, though it does not 
involve any transaction cost. Equb, however, can serve as a means to implement the saving up strategy by overcoming lack of discipline 
and commitment of other options, or the saving down strategy by offering the service with little transaction cost, if there is any. The 
following conclusions are drawn for the financial gain of participating in equb: 
¾ For those who join equb to be committed and want to take the last pot, the net payment to the service they intended to get from 
equb as compared to making an ordinary saving in a bank or MFI is equal to the interest forgone plus the transaction cost incurred in 
equb less the transaction cost had they use the bank. Usually the transaction cost in formal institutions is higher than those of the informal 
and hence the net loss after calculating transaction cost will be lower than the interest they forgo! 
¾ For those who use the equb as a credit mechanism and use the ordinary bank saving as a standard, the net gain they enjoy by 
joining equb will be equal to the gain from the investment between the pot winning period and the nth period plus the transaction cost in 
bank or MFI less transaction cost in equb. By the same effect of the transaction cost, the net gain from joining equb will be higher that the 
gain from investment. 
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¾ For those who use the equb as a credit mechanism and use bank lending rate as a standard, the net gain they enjoy by joining 
equb will be equal to the interest expense they avoid plus transaction cost in bank less transaction cost in equb. By the same effect of the 
transaction cost, the net gain from joining equb will be higher that the interest expense avoided. 
Although the principal motive of large equb members are financial, most of them have indicated other social motives, albeit to a 
lesser extent than members of middle and small size equbs. Similarly, members of medium and small size equbs also enjoy the credit 
service provided by their membership. It should be emphasized, however, that the financial motive dominates other motives in large size 
equbs, while the social motive dominates other motives in small size equbs, and the commitment motive outweighs other motives in 
medium size equbs. The flexible nature of equbs contributes much for all those features that this institution holds. These institutions are 
informal and exhibit great flexibility which is limited in formal institutions. The results of this study are in line with other studies 
(Bouman, 1994) who emphasize the benefits of the rather informal structure of such credit organizations. Indeed it is the informal 
structure of the equb that attracts and keep individuals to participate in equb. 
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Appendix A. List of Sample Equbs and number of samples taken 
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Table 1. Sample selection and characteristics 
Size of 
equb 
 
Name or specific 
location of equb 
        
   Location 
Contribution 
frequency 
Contribution/person 
(in ETB) 
No. of 
participants 
filled & 
Returned 
questionnaires 
Interview 
with 
organizer 
Urban  Rural Yes  No 
Large 
equbs 
Shiromeda traders’ 
equb 
9  Weekly 2,500 62 5 9  
Ehil Berenda 
traders’ equb 
9  Weekly 2,000 98 4 9  
Traders’ equb in 
piassa area 
9  Weekly 1,000 67 5  9
Filakit traders’ 
equb 
 9 Weekly 1200 54 12 9  
Geregera traders 
equb 
 9 Weekly 1200 48 6  9
Medium 
equbs 
Nile insurance 
main branch staffs 
equb 
9  Monthly 500 10 5 9  
United bank Itegue 
Taytu branch staffs 
equb 
9  Monthly 500 8 5 9  
Arat killo area 
computer typing 
and photocopy 
shop equb 
9  Weekly 150 13 5 9  
Kebele 05 equb 
(Janmeda area) 
9  Bi/weekly 500/250 31 3 9  
Meket Woreda 
Agricultural Office 
staffs equb 
 9 Monthly 500 9 5 9  
Meket Woreda 
Finance Office 
staffs equb 
 9 Monthly 500 11 5 9  
Meket Woreda 
Education Bureau 
equb 
 9 Monthly 500 11 3  9
Small 
equbs 
Ferensay legasion 
tela sellers’ equb 
9  Monthly 100 12 4 9  
Ferensay legasion 
tej bet equb 
9  Weekly 25 35 3  9
Womens equb in 
05 kebele of 
Janmeda area 
9  Monthly 100 10 3 9  
Ferensay legasion 
film rental house 
equb 
9  Weekly 100 13 5 9  
St. Micheal equb  9 Weekly 100 39 8 9  
Farmers’ equb in 
Maserut 
 9 Weekly 25 18 6 9  
Appendix B. Survey results 
Table1: Respondents ideal number of participants in one equb cycle 
equbtype 
ideal number of participants in one equb cycle 
Total 
less than 10 10 -- 20 21 -- 30 above 30 I dont care 
frequency %age frequency %age frequency %age frequency %age frequency %age 
Urban - large 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 7.1 13 92.9 0 0.0 14 
Urban - medium 9 50.0 7 38.9 2 11.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 18 
Urban - Small 5 38.5 6 46.2 0 0.0 2 15.4 0 0.0 13 
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Rural - large 0 0.0 1 5.6 2 11.1 14 77.8 1 5.6 18 
Rural - medium 9 64.3 5 35.7 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 14 
Rural - small 0 0.0 5 35.7 9 64.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 14 
Total 23 25.3 24 26.4 14 15 29 31.9 1 1.1 91 
 
 
Table 2. Members time preference to take a pot in equb 
Equb type 
time preference to take 
Total at the beginning in the middle at the end I don’t care 
frequency %age frequency %age frequency %age frequency %age 
Urban - large 10 71.4 4 28.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 14 
Urban - medium 3 16.7 5 27.8 5 27.8 5 27.8 18 
Urban - Small 1 7.7 1 7.7 11 84.6 0 0.0 13 
Rural - large 13 72.2 3 16.7 1 5.6 1 5.6 18 
Rural - medium 3 21.4 6 42.9 2 14.3 3 21.4 14 
Rural - small 7 50.0 4 28.6 2 14.3 1 7.1 14 
Total 37 40.7 23 25.3 21 23.1 10 11.0 91 
 
Table 3. Members’ preference of pot assignment method 
Equb Type 
Which assignment method do you prefer 
Total assignment on lottery basis assignment based on members preference i dont care 
Frequency %age Frequency %age Frequency %age 
Urban - large 11 78.6 3 21.4 0 0.0 14 
Urban - medium 11 61.1 7 38.9 0 0.0 18 
Urban - small 4 30.8 6 46.2 3 23.1 13 
Rural - large 11 61.1 6 33.3 1 5.6 18 
Rural - medium 8 57.1 5 35.7 1 7.1 14 
Rural - small 4 28.6 10 71.4 0 0.0 14 
Total 49 53.8 37 40.7 5 5.5 91 
 
 
Fig. 1. Have members’ ever thought about time value of money in equb or not? 
 
Table 4. Members’ choice of a substitute institution for equb 
Equb type 
             What will substitute equb for you?  
Total Bank  MFI Iddir Mahiber Nothing else 
freq. %age freq. %age freq. %age freq. %age freq. %age 
Urban-large 6 42.9 5 35.7 0 0.0 0 0.0 3 21.4 14 
Urban-medium 5 27.8 7 38.9 0 0.0 1 5.6 5 27.8 18 
Urban-small 3 23.1 1 7.7 1 7.7 0 0.0 8 61.5 13 
Rural-large 7 38.9 7 38.9 1 5.6 0 0.0 3 16.7 18 
Rural-medium 1 7.1 4 28.6 0 0.0 2 14.3 7 50.0 14 
Rural-small 1 7.1 2 14.3 0 0.0 1 7.1 10 71.4 14 
 
